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1 Introduction
That individuals' preferences might be incomplete is an old idea. The concept has already
been suggested in, e.g., Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, pp 19-20), Armstrong
(1950), Quandt (1956), and Aumann (1962). Decision makers may often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
compare two alternatives over which there is limited information. Aumann (1962) argues
that the completeness of the preferences is neither realistic nor normative. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) suggest that it is conceivable and in a way more realistic to
allow for incomplete preferences. Much advance has been made on incomplete preferences.
Among others, see e.g., Dubra et al. (2004); Ok et al. (2012); Galaabaatar and Karni (2013)
for recent developments.
Yet, a question remains: what would people do when they are forced to make a choice in
the face of incomplete preferences? People are often confronted with such decision situ-
ations. For example, a young PhD graduate receives two job oﬀers from universities she
is not entirely faimilair with, or a young family sees a few acceptable houses needs to
decide which one to buy. People do make a decision ultimately in those situations, i.e.,
individuals (are forced to) complete incomplete preferences in the end. Then, what are
the behavioral consequences in the process of completing incomplete preferences? In this
paper we go beyond incomplete preferences per se and provide an answer for the above
questions. We propose a model for individuals who have incomplete preferences and at-
tempt to complete them. Based on the model, we then discuss two behavioral implications
- the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-ask (WTP-WTA) gap as well as the present
bias - that might arise naturally in the attempt of completing incomplete preferences. Fi-
nally, we develop an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure the incompleteness in
preferences and implement a ﬁrst experimental test of the model.
Concretely, we capture incomplete preferences by individuals having not a single but a set
of utility functions. This idea is consistent with the deﬁnition of incomplete preferences
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in, e.g., Dubra et al. (2004) and Ok et al. (2012). Given any speciﬁc utility function in
this set, individuals have complete preferences and perform standard expected utility cal-
culations. Unlike decision models under ambiguity, we deﬁne the set of states to be the
set of individual's utility functions, with each utility function corresponding to a potential
state. Individuals' ultimate decision utility is obtained by aggregating across utility func-
tions. The aggregation process is done by taking a subjective expectation of the concavely
transformed standard expected utilities with respect to the set of utility functions.
Based on the model, we discuss the WTP-WTA gap rigorously. We show that the WTP-
WTA gap can be due to a cautious attitude when one attempts to complete incomplete
preferences. Intuitively, a cautious completion of incomplete preferences leads to cautious
reasoning. Individuals' cautious reasoning takes the form of what if the alternative is
not worth that much when reporting WTP, and this cautious thinking lowers WTP;
whereas individuals' cautious reasoning takes the form of what if the alternative is worth
more when reporting WTA, and this cautious thinking increases WTA. Together, the two
instances of cautious reasoning create the WTP-WTA gap. We also identify the present
bias in intertemporal choice (see e.g., Frederick et al., 2002) and show that this bias can
be a natural consequence of a cautious completion of incomplete preferences.
Finally, we develop an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure the incompleteness
in preferences. In the mechanism, individuals face a series of tasks. In each of these
tasks, individuals face two alternatives: an alternative x over which we are interested in
knowing the incompleteness in preferences, and a sure payment y, over which individuals
have (more) complete preferences. Instead of choosing one option out of the two, as in
typical pairwise choice tasks, individuals are allowed to choose a λ ∈ [0, 1] and build
a simple lottery (λx, (1 − λ)y). When individuals' preferences are incomplete and their
behavior is in line with our model, we show that (1) there exists a unique optimal λ∗
that maximizes each individual's decision utility; (2) the value of the optimal λ∗ can be
used to calculate the incompleteness in preferences over alternative x. In particular, the
value of λ can be interpreted as the choice probability in the stochastic choice models (e.g.,
Machina, 1985; Harless and Camerer, 1994b), has a striking similarity to the matching
law in operant conditioning (Herrnstein, 1961; McDowell, 2005), and reﬂects a taste for
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ﬂexibility (Cerreia-Vioglio, 2009). We ran an experiment to check the performance of
our measurement mechanism. Option x was a payment of 20 euro in one month's time,
while Option y consisted of an immediate payment ranging from 11 euro to 20 euro with
1 euro increments. Our subjects exhibited a strong preference for mixing Option x with
Option y. The median λs assigned to Option x were, respectively, 1.00 when Option y
was 15 euro or lower, 0.955 when Option y was 16 euro, 0.87 when Option y was 17 euro,
0.65 when Option y was 18 euro, 0.45 when Option y was 19 euro, 0.00 when Option y
was 20 euro. Such a preference for a deliberate randomization has also been observed in
some recent experiments. Without an explicit model, Agranov and Ortoleva (2015) in one
treatment explicitly tell subjects that choices are repeated three times. They ﬁnd that
a large majority of subjects deliberately choose one option in some choices and another
in other choices. Dwenger et al. (2014) ﬁnd that decision makers, when facing two risky
alternatives, sometimes prefer delegating the decision to an external random device, e.g., a
coin ﬂip, to making the choice themselves. They attribute this preference to responsibility
aversion. Dean and McNeil (2014) ﬁnd that 48% of subjects exhibit strict preference for
ﬂexibility, and they attribute the taste for ﬂexibility to subjects being uncertain about
their future preferences.
Our paper is related to a recent paper by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). They start with stan-
dard axioms - including the compleness axiom - and replace only the independence axiom
with a weaker axiom which they call Negative Certainty Independence. They characterize
utility representations for all preferences that satisfy Negative Certainty Independence and
other basic rationality postulates. In their representation individuals behave as if they have
a set of utility functions and evaluate alternatives according to the utility function giving
the lowest certainty equivalent; other utility functions or the incompleteness in preferences
play no role. They show beautifully that the representation can be used to complete an
incomplete preference relation. Our model starts with incomplete preferences and aims to
complete them. The model is built on a diﬀerent set of assumptions, and the represen-
tation is characterized by smoothness. In the completion process individuals consider all
utility functions in the set, and the incompleteness in preferences plays a central role. More
importantly, due to the smoothness of the representation an incentive-compatible measure
of the incompleteness in preferences can be developed.
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There is a close parallel between our model and ambiguity models of multiple priors. In-
deed, in ambiguity models of multiple priors, an individual faces an ambiguous scenario
and she has a number of probability measures, i.e., multiple priors. In our model, an indi-
vidual is uncertain which utility functions she should use to evaluate an alternative. Note,
however, that the two lines of models are conceptually diﬀerent. In models of multiple
priors, the individual has a unique utility function, and the focus is on the aggregation
across diﬀerent probability measures. In the current model, the individual faces a simple
lottery, and the diﬃculty arises in the aggregation across types. In the development of
assumptions and obtaining the representation theorem, we borrow the modeling technique
of multiple priors models, the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) in partic-
ular, and apply it to incomplete preferences. We show that, with some minor departures
from the standard expected utility theory, our model explains a broad range of anomalies,
e.g., the WTP-WTA gap, the present bias, stochastic choices, and the matching law in
operant conditioning.
Our paper is related to probabilistic choice models (e.g., McFadden, 1973; Harless and
Camerer, 1994b; Hey and Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1995), and the literature on
choice of menus (e.g., Ahn and Sarver, 2013; Karni and Safra, 2014). Our model is
fundamentally diﬀerent from those models. There is no error term, and choices from a
given menu are deterministic. Our preferences are over a single lottery instead of over
menus. We postpone a more detailed discussion and comparison of the related literature
to Section 4.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of valuation under incomplete
preferences and discusses the assumptions of the model. Based on the model, Section
3 provides an incentive-compatible measure of the incompleteness in preferences. After
presenting and discussing our model, we compare it to the most closely related literature
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Completing incomplete preferences: the model
We capture an individual's incomplete preferences by assuming that she has not a single but
a set of utility functions. The set of individual's utility functions is deﬁned as the state space
in the sense of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), with each utility function corresponding to
a potential state. As a concrete example, consider an individual sometimes prefers wine
to beer, i.e., the utility over wine is higher than the utility over beer when he is in a wine
mood, and in other times he prefers beer to wine, i.e., the utility over beer is higher than
the utility over wine when he is in a beer mood. The individual needs to decide whether
to attend a wine tasting event or a beer festival one month from now. The individual may
ﬁnd this decision diﬃcult to make, i.e., she has incomplete preferences. To make a decision
the individual needs to ﬁnd a way to complete her preferences. Below we propose such a
model.
Let C be a closed and bounded outcome space, and c ∈ C be an outcome. The set of
outcomes includes all possible aspects of a decision that aﬀect the decision maker's well-
being. Thus, the outcome space is not limited to monetary outcomes. It also includes, for
example, a one-week trip to Paris, an increased safety of a car, or an improvement in air
quality. A risky lottery l ∈ L is then a cumulative probability measure over C. The model
is mainly interested in , an individual's preference over L. In a standard expected utility
framework, the individual's preference is captured by a single utility function, u, u : L→ R,
such that for any risky lotteries l1 and l2 ∈ L, l1  l2 ⇐⇒
´
C u (c) dl1 ≥
´
C u (c) dl2. When
 is potentially incomplete, Dubra et al. (2004) suggest the following representation: There
exists a set {uτ}τ∈Γ of real functions on L such that, for all lotteries l1 and l2,
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
ˆ
C
uτ (c) dl1 ≥
ˆ
C
uτ (c) dl2 ∇τ ∈ Γ.
When the set {uτ}τ∈Γ is of a singleton, we are back to the standard expected utility
theory with complete preferences. When an individual's preference over L is incomplete,
diﬃculties arise. In this case, it is unclear how an individual makes a decision. We deﬁne
the set of the individual's possible preference orderings as the type space. Let τ ∈ Γ be
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The deciding individual
Type 1 Type 2 ... Type n
l l ... l
The deciding individual
ce1(l) ce2(l) ... cen(l)
Table 1: The left panel depicts the decision problem D(l) when the individual faces l
and has n types. The right panel depicts the decision problem D(f), where ceτ (l) is the
certainty equivalent of l for type τ .
one potential type and Γ denote the type space. Given a type τ , an individual's preference
over the set of lotteries is clear and complete. Let τ denote this preference.
Assumption 1. Expected Utility Over Risky Lotteries Given a Type. Given a type, τ ,
there exists a unique utility function, uτ , continuous, strictly increasing, and normalized
so that for some c1, c2, uτ (c1) = 0 and uτ (c2) = 1 such that for all l1 and l2 ∈ L, l1 τ l2
if and only if
´
C uτ (c) dl1 ≥
´
C uτ (c) dl2.
An individual's preference of type τ can then be captured by utility function uτ (· ), ∀τ ∈
Γ. These utility functions are an artiﬁcial construct; one cannot directly observe them.
However, the existence of such utility functions should not be surprising. For example, an
individual is a ﬁnancial expert and has accumulated extensive experiences with ﬁnancial
products. With these experiences, her preference over ﬁnancial products could become
suﬃciently complete to be represented by a utility function. Given the above setup, the
individual essentially faces the situation depicted in the left panel of Table 1. Let D(l)
denote the decision problem when the individual faces l.
Let ceτ (l) denote the certainty equivalent of risky lottery l given type τ . For any risky lot-
tery l, let EUτ (l) =
´
C uτ (c) dl. From Assumption 1, we know that uτ (ceτ (l)) = EUτ (l).
The diﬃculty remains: how does an individual aggregate across types? Aggregation of sim-
ilar forms has been discussed extensively in the social welfare literature (see e.g., Hicks,
1939). It is generally agreed that aggregating across diﬀerent individuals is extremely diﬃ-
cult or even meaningless. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) do not attempt to aggregate across
types. Instead, by invoking the negative certainty independence axiom, they obtain a rep-
resentation similar to the Rawlsian scheme: the alternative is evaluated by the type who
gives the lowest certainty equivalent. We believe more can be done. Recall in Assump-
tion 1 that the utility function, uτ , is normalized so that for some c1, c2, uτ (c1) = 0 and
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uτ (c2) = 1. Thus, utility functions, although diﬀerent across types, are based on the same
metric. Comparison among types is thus not comparing apples and oranges. After all,
the aggregation across types is performed for one individual. We believe, the idea that for
the same individual there exists a common scale of utility across types is a plausible one.
For example, Binmore (1998, chapter 4, p.259) concludes that intrapersonal comparisons of
oneself in diﬀerent roles in a society are completely acceptable. This observation motivates
the next assumption. But before stating it, a new object needs to be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1. An act, f ∈ F , is a function f : Γ → C that assigns each type to an
outcome.
The act f is deﬁned over the type space instead of the state space, thus it is diﬀerent
from the act deﬁned in, e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005). Yet,
it is consistent with the Savage act where the states of the world is the type space. For
this reason we still call f an act. Note that f(τ) ∈ C is an outcome given a type τ . For
example, an individual faces an act when facing a sure outcome, e.g., a payoﬀ of 100 euro
in one year, a one-week trip to Paris, or an improvement in air quality. Let f denote the
individual's preference over the acts.We can now state the second assumption.
Assumption 2. Aggregation in the Form of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) over Acts.
There exists a countably additive probability measure pi ∈ Π and a continuous and strictly
increasing function v : C → R such that for all f1, f2 ∈ F ,
f1 f f2 ⇐⇒
ˆ
Γ
v[f1(τ)]dpi ≥
ˆ
Γ
v[f2(τ)]dpi.
The subjective probability distribution pi captures the individual's subjective assessment
of the relevance of the types in evaluating l. Assumption 2 is crucial. It deﬁnes how
aggregation across types takes place. Aggregation in the form of SEU in Assumption
2 takes place in the following manner: for each type τ the lottery l is replaced by an
outcome f(τ) ∈ C. As evidenced by the use of τ , the f(τ) have already reﬂected the
diﬀerence in types. For example, f(τ) could be the certainty equivalent of l given uτ .
Thus, as depicted in the right panel of Table 1, the individual essentially faces an act f .
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These f(τ)s are evaluated by the function v(·) and then weighted by pi, the individual's
subjective assessment of the relevance of the types in evaluating l. Let D(f) denote the
decision problem when the individual faces f .
Given a type, τ , by Assumption 1, lottery l is evaluated with the utility function uτ
according to the expected utility theory. An individual should then be indiﬀerent between
facing lottery l as in D(l) or facing f that produces ceτ (l) for each type τ as in D(f). This
property motivates the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. Given l ∈ L, f l ∈ F denotes an act reduced from l. The reduced act of l,
f l, is deﬁned as
f l(τ) = ceτ (l) for ∀τ∈Γ .
The ﬁnal assumption relates the preference ordering of lotteries l ∈ L to the preference
ordering of their reduced acts f l ∈ F :
Assumption 3. Consistency with Preferences over Reduced Acts. Given l1, l2 ∈ L and
their reduced acts, f l1, f
l
2 ∈ F,
l1  l2 ⇐⇒ f l1 f f l2.
Assumption 3 essentially states that the individual regards D(f) and D(l) equivalent.
Assumption 3 suggests how preferences over acts f are related to preferences over lotteries
. Based on assumption 1, 2, and 3, it can then be shown that
Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1, 2, and 3, there exists a continuous and strictly increas-
ing φ : R → R subjecting to positive aﬃne transformation such that  is represented by
the preference functional V : L→ R given by
V (l) =
ˆ
Γ
φ [EU τ (l)] dpi. (1)
Please see Appendix 1 for the proof. In Equation 1 pi measures the incompleteness in prefer-
ences and φ(·) captures attitudes toward the incomplete preferences. In principle, function
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φ(·) can be concave, linear, or convex, and the curvature of φ(·) captures an individual's
attitudes toward incomplete preferences. A concave φ(·) implies aversion to incomplete
preferences; a linear φ(·) implies a neutral attitude toward incomplete preferences; and a
convex φ(·) implies incomplete preferences seeking. Below we assume that individuals are
averse to incomplete preferences and, hence, φ(·) is concave. Note that to arrive at a single
value when one has many types is, in essence, similar to situations where a group of people
with diﬀerent opinions tries to reach a consensus. The more strongly members disagree
with each other, the more diﬃcult it is for the group to make compromises and agree on
a single opinion. Aversion to the incompleteness in preferences can then be interpreted as
the cost of forcing diﬀerent types to agree on a single value.
2.1 Two implications of the model
Below we discuss two anomalies in light of the model. One anomaly, the WTP-WTA gap,
has been intuitively linked to ideas closely related to the incompleteness in preferences
(Dubourg et al., 1994), and here we provide a formal demonstration.1 The linkage of
incomplete preferences and the other anomaly - the present bias in intertemporal choice -
is new.
2.1.1 The WTP-WTA gap
In this section, we show that when individuals behave cautiously when completing in-
complete preferences, they display a WTP-WTA gap. Suppose an individual is thinking
of buying alternative x. To illustrate the idea intuitively, we ﬁrst consider a situation
where − φ′′(·)−φ′(·) approaches to inﬁnity, i.e., the individual is extremely cautious and consid-
ers only the worst scenario. In this case, the worst scenario is the alternative has a value
of minτ∈ΓEUτ (x) when she is prompted to buy, and thus WTP = u−1τ∗ (minτ∈Γ EUτ (x)) ,
where τ∗ is the type with the minimum expected utility. The worst scenario is the al-
ternative has a value of maxτ∈Γ EUτ (x) when she is asked to sell, and thus WTP =
1Dubourg et al. (1994) discuss the WTP-WTA gap in a framework similar to incomplete preferences,
the so-called âthe imprecision in preferences.
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u−1τ (maxτ∈Γ EUτ (x)) , where τ∗ is the type with the maximum expected utility.
More formally, the individual cares about the utility surplus she obtains from buying
alternative x. Given a utility function uτ and the expected utility EUτ (x) of alternative
x, the consumer's utility when she pays p is: EUτ (x) − uτ (p). An incentive-compatible
mechanism should result in WTP such that the individual's decision utility of buying
alternative x at the price of WTP is equal to zero:
ˆ
Γ
φ[EUτ (x)− uτ (WTP )]dpi = 0. (2)
Similarly, when an individual is selling alternative x, she cares about the utility surplus
she obtains from selling alternative x. Given a utility function uτ and the expected utility
EUτ (x) of alternative x, the consumer's utility when receiving p is: uτ (p) − EUτ (x). An
incentive-compatible mechanism should result in WTA such that the individual's decision
utility of selling alternative x at the price of WTA is equal to zero:
ˆ
Γ
φ[uτ (WTA)− EUτ (x)]dpi = 0. (3)
The above formulation is consistent with the inertia assumption in Bewley (1986), where
he suggests that an individual moves away from the status quo - buying or selling an
alternative here - only if the alternative option is suﬃciently attractive (in the sense of
dominance). When an individual has a unique stable utility function, the two above
conditions reduce to EU(x) − u(WTP ) = 0 and u(WTA) − EU(x) = 0, and, hence,
WTP = WTA. However, when an individual has a set of utility functions and φ(·) is
concave, we have WTP < WTA.
Proposition 1. When an individual has incomplete preferences over an alternative and she
is strictly averse to incomplete preferences, i.e., φ(·) is strictly concave, we have WTP <
WTA .
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix 2.
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The following numerical example provides some intuitive ideas about the impact of con-
cavity of function φ(x) on the WTP −WTA gap. An individual has two utility functions,
uτ , τ = 1, 2, u1(x) = 1, and u2(x) = 0 for option x, and she considers both utility functions
equally likely. To simplify calculation, assume for the sure payoﬀ p uτ (p) = p, τ = 1, 2. Buy-
ing alternative x at the price of p gives the individual a utility surplus of u1(x)− p = 1− p
under u1and a utility surplus of u2(x) = 0− p under u2. Selling alternative x at the price
of p gives the individual a utility surplus of p − u1(x) − p = p − 1 under u1 and a utility
surplus of p− u2(x) = p under u2. According to conditions 2 and 3, we have:
0.5φ[u1(x)−WTP ] + 0.5φ[u2(x)−WTP ] = 0.5φ(1−WTP ) + 0.5φ(0−WTP ) = 0.5(1−
e−(1−WTP )) + 0.5(1− e−(0−WTP )) = 1− e−0 = 0,
0.5φ[WTA − u1(x)] + 0.5φ[WTA − u2(x)] = 0.5φ(WTA − 1) + 0.5φ(WTA) = 0.5(1 −
e−(WTA−1)) + 0.5(1− e−WTA) = 1− e−0 = 0.
Solving for WTP and WTA, we obtain WTP = 0.4 and WTA = 0.6. Since WTA =
0.6 > WTP = 0.4, there is a WTP-WTA gap.
Intuitively, an individual who is averse to incomplete preferences behaves cautiously when
considering to buy or sell an alternative. Speciﬁcally, she may think: what if the alter-
native is not worth that much when considering to buy an alternative, and this cautious
thinking lowers the price she is willing to pay; whereas cautious thinking would take the
form of what if the alternative is worth more when the individual is considering to sell
an alternative, and this cautious thinking increases the price she is willing to accept.
The above demonstration also shows that to produce a WTP-WTA gap, one condition
must be met: individuals' preferences must be suﬃciently incomplete. Plott and Zeiler's
(2005) ﬁndings have produced a substantial inﬂuence in the literature that explains the
WTP-WTA gap. The model we propose adds insights to their ﬁndings. Plott and Zeiler
(2005) attributed the WTP-WTA gap to inappropriate experimental elicitation procedures.
According to our model, unclear experimental procedures produce subjects' misconceptions
and, hence, causes preferences to be less complete. The high level of incompleteness sub-
sequently leads to the WTP-WTA gap. The Plott and Zeiler procedure makes clear the
12
relationship between choices and their consequences under the evaluation mechanism and
reduces the degree of the incompleteness in preferences. This leads to a smaller WTP-
WTA gap. Inconsistent with Plott and Zeiler (2005), our model predicts that the Plott
and Zeiler procedure cannot eliminate the WTP-WTA gap if the preference over a good at
consideration is suﬃciently incomplete. Indeed, Isoni et al. (2011a) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and
persistent WTP-WTA gap when the same experimental procedures are applied to lotteries,
an evidence supporting our model.
2.1.2 The present bias
In Samuelson's (1937) discounted utility model on intertemporal choice, discount rates are
constant. Abundant empirical studies have found, however, that discount rates decline
over time (see, e.g., Table 1 in Frederick et al., 2002). The empirical anomaly of declining
discount rates is often referred to as the present bias. There have been some explanations
on the psychological motives underlying the present bias, for example, models of habit
formation (see, e.g., Ryder and Heal, 1973), models of utility from anticipation (Loewen-
stein, 1987), reference-point models (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), and visceral inﬂuences
(Loewenstein, 2000). Here, we oﬀer a new explanation based on the incompleteness in pref-
erences.
The present bias is illustrated in Figure 1. Individuals need to estimate the present utilities
of a certain amount of money at time 0, time 1, ..., time 4. For the ease of demonstration,
suppose the present utility of the amount of money at time 0 is 100. Letting subjects be
time consistent and δ denote the discount factor, we have the present utility of 100 at time
t to be 100δt. This is captured by the squares in the ﬁgure. Empirical studies typically
found that individuals do not discount future rewards consistently (see, e.g., Frederick
et al., 2002, and the references therein). Instead, individuals' discounting behavior is
characterized by a relatively high discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low
discount rate over long horizons. Laibson (1997) oﬀers a quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model that captures such behavior. In his model, the utility of 100 at time t discounted
to present would be 100βδt, where parameter β captures the present bias. The solid dots
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in Figure 1 represent the values calculated according to the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model of Laibson (1997) .
To explain the present with incomplete preferences, note that individuals' preferences over
a sure payment now can be certain but may become incomplete in the future. In many
models of intertemporal decisions, individuals' utilities from consumption  their tastes
 change over time, and to predict the exact future taste is diﬃcult (Loewenstein et al.,
2003). Kreps (1979) attributes a preference for ﬂexibility to an anticipation of uncertain
future tastes. As a consequence of the uncertainty in tastes, the set of possible types
becomes larger when one projects into the future, i.e., the set of utility function becomes
larger. The incompleteness in preferences over the money at time t is captured by the
vertical bars. As one can see, instead of having a single point value, the discounted present
utility of a future payment at time t lies in a certain range. Since individuals are averse to
incomplete preferences, they report a value smaller than the mean of the discounted present
utilities, e.g., the solid dots in Figure 1. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that
the marginal change of the incompleteness in preferences is much larger when one moves
from present to the future than that when one moves from the future to a more distant
future. Consequently, individuals discount more when a future date payoﬀ is compared
to a present date payoﬀ than when a future date payoﬀ is compared to a a more distant
future date payoﬀ . Speciﬁcally, discount rates decline over time.
Our model oﬀers an explanation for an interesting observation in Sutter et al. (2013), who
ﬁnd that students with high intellectual capacity are also more patient. In our framework,
highly intellectual students have more complete preferences over future payoﬀs. As a result,
they discount future payoﬀs less and behave more patiently.
3 An incentive-compatible measurement of incomplete pref-
erences
As the discussion in the introduction highlights, there have been a number of papers on
the existence and importance of incomplete preferences. A natural question to ask, then,
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Figure 1: The present bias and the incompleteness in preferences. The x-axis represents
time from present, and time 0 denotes present. The y-axis represents the utilities dis-
counted to present.
given an alternative, is how we measure the incompleteness in preferences? According to
Equation 1, an individual's incompleteness in preferences is captured by the subjective
distribution f over uτ . Consistent with the literature in decision making under risk, a
natural candidate for the measurement of the incompleteness in preferences is the standard
deviation of the subjective distribution pi over uτ (σ2pi). Hence, if we could somehow measure
σ2pi, we would obtain a proxy for the incompleteness in preferences. Below we propose such
a measurement mechanism. As it will be seen shortly, it is incentive-compatible and easy
to implement.
More speciﬁcally, the mechanism works as follows. An individual faces two options. Denote
these two options by x and y. Option y is a yardstick, and we are interested in measuring
the individual's incompleteness in preferences over Option x. In most preceding studies, an
individual would be asked to choose between two options, Option x and Option y (see e.g.,
Holt, 1986). In the so-called outcome matching method, an individual is asked to compare
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option x with a list of increasing sure payoﬀs y.2 To be eﬃcient and avoid inconsistent
choices, a frequently used approach is to explicitly require the individual to indicate a
single switching point where the preference between options x and y reverses. As argued
by Butler et al. (2014), however, straightforward choices yield only limited dichotomous
information. In particular, there is no room for individuals to express their incompleteness
in preferences.
In the current mechanism, we proceed diﬀerently: we ask the individual, instead of choosing
one option out of the two, to choose a λ ∈ [0, 1] and build a simple lottery: (λx, (1− λ)y).
The meaning of the lottery (λx, (1−λ)y) is easier to understand for decisions with a ﬁnite
set of outcomes. Let x be (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) and y be (y1, q1; ...; yn, qn), then (λx, (1 −
λ)y)=(x1, λp1; ...;xn, λpn; y, (1− λ)q1; ...; yn, (1− λ)qn). Below we show that, when the
individual behaves according to our model, there exist some values of y inducing the
individual to strictly prefer the lottery (λx, (1− λ)y), with 0 < λ < 1, over Option x and
Option y.
By Assumption 1, the individual's preference over the lottery (λx, (1−λ)y) satisﬁes the ex-
pected utility theory for any type τ . Explicitly, given a type τ , we haveEUτ [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
λEUτ (x) + (1 − λ)EUτ (y). The individual's decision is then to maximize her utility by
choosing 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 properly:
Maxλ V [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
ˆ
Γ
φ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] dpi.
Taking ﬁrst order derivative of the above equation gives3
2In discussion below Option y is often an alternative oﬀering a sure amount of payment y. When no
confusion is possible we abuse the use of notations slightly and identify y with Option y.
3The second-order derivative is
d2V [λx+ (1− λy)]
dλ2
=
ˆ
Γ
φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)]× [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 dpi.
Since φ(·) is concave, φ′′(·) is negative. We are interested in situations where options x and y are not
the same, i.e., EUτ (x) 6= EUτ (y) for some τ ∈ Γ . Together we have φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] ×
[EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 ≤ 0, and the inequality is strict for some τ ∈ Γ . Consequently, d
2V [λx+(1−λy)]
dλ2
=´
Γ
φ′′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] × [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)]2 dpi < 0. This ensures we are indeed seeking for
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dV [λx+ (1− λ)y]
dλ
=
ˆ
Γ
φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)]× [EUτ (x)− EUτ (y)] dpi = 0.
In some cases, preferences of x over y can be straightforward, e.g., when options can be
ordered by some dominance rules. For example, when options x and y are risky lotteries and
option x ﬁrst degree stochastically dominates option y, it seems natural that individuals
have EUτ (x) > EUτ (y), for ∀τ ∈ Γ. Since φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] > 0, this leads
to a positive ﬁrst order condition and, hence, λ = 1. Unfortunately, two options cannot in
general be ordered via simple dominance rules, such as ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance.
When options x and y cannot be ordered by simple dominance rules , diﬀerent uτ might
oﬀer a diﬀerent ordering of the two options. In such situations the choice of λ would give
insights on the incompleteness in preferences over option x.
Note that EUτ (x) and EUτ (y) are random variables governed by the probability distribu-
tion pi. Let X = EUτ (x) and Y = EUτ (y), and ∆τ = X − Y . With these notations, we
have
φ′ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] = φ′ [Y + λ∆τ ] .
We are mostly interested in the scenario where the individual ﬁnds choosing out of Option x
and Option y diﬃcult, i.e., when the two options are similar. Speciﬁcally, we are interested
in those situations where ∆τ is small relative to X and Y. When this is the case, we can
use the Taylor expansion and obtain
φ′ [Y + λ∆τ ] = φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ +O (λ∆τ ) ≈ φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ ,
where O (λ∆τ ) is the sum of the terms that have λ∆τ with a power of two or higher. The
above ﬁrst order condition can then be written as
the maximum.
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dV [λx+(1−λ)y]
dλ =
´
Γ φ
′ [Y + λ∆τ ] ∆τdpi,
≈ ´Γ [φ′(Y ) + φ′′(Y )λ∆τ ] ∆τdpi
= Eτ [φ
′(Y )∆τ ] + λEτ
[
φ′′(Y )∆2τ
]
= 0,
where Eτ (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution pi . Solving for λ,
and we have
λ∗ =

0
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
1
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
≤ 0,
0<- Eτ [φ
′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
< 1,
− Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ]
Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ]
≥ 1.
It seems reasonable to assume that the individual's preference over a sure payment today
is complete. Such an assumption is similar to but weaker than the requirement that
preferences are complete over constant acts (see e.g., Ok et al., 2012).4 Speciﬁcally, when
option y is a sure payment, Y would be a constant. It follows then that Eτ [φ′(Y )∆τ ] =
φ′(Y )Eτ [∆τ ], and Eτ [φ′′(Y )∆2τ ] = φ′′(Y )Eτ [∆2τ ]. Similar to decision making under risk,
let −φ′′(Y )φ′(Y ) denote a metric of attitudes toward the incompleteness in preferences, and the
optimal value of λ becomes:
λ∗ =

0
1
−φ′′(Y )
φ′(Y )
× Eτ [∆τ ]
Eτ [∆2τ ]
1
λ∗ ≤ 0,
0<λ∗ < 1,
λ∗ ≥ 1.
(4)
Recall ∆τ = X − Y . We then have Eτ
[
∆2τ
]
= Eτ
[
(X − Y )2] = σ2x + [Eτ (X)− Y ]2
and Eτ [∆τ ] = Eτ (X) − Y . Thus, when 0<λ∗ < 1, the optimal value of λ∗ decreases
with the incompleteness in preferences over option x and the individual's attitudes toward
the incompleteness in preferences. When σ2x > [Eτ (X)− Y ]2, i.e., the incompleteness in
preferences is suﬃciently large, λ∗ increases with ∆τ .
4In those papers acts are deﬁned over the external state space, not over the type space.
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Equation 4 can be used to estimate δ2x. Y is the utility over sure outcomes and is relatively
easy to estimate. The metric for incompleteness attitudes −φ′′(Y )φ′(Y ) should not change sub-
stantially with small variation of Y . With Y at hand, only three variables in Equation 4
remain unknown: a measure of the incompleteness in preferences that we want to estimate
σ2x, the metric for incompleteness attitudes −φ
′′(Y )
φ′(Y ) , and Eτ (X). Note that there is an
optimal λ∗ for each Y . With three Y s and accordingly three λ∗, one can easily calculate
σ2x.
As a concrete illustration, consider the following numerical example: suppose the individual
has two types τ = 1, 2, and Prob(u1) = 0.5 and Prob(u2) = 0.5. There are two options,
Option x and Option y. Option x is a lottery, and EU1(x) = 1 and EU2(x) = 0. Option y
is a sure payment, and the individual's preference over y is precise, i.e., EU1(y) = EU2(y).
For the ease of illustration, assume further that EU1(y) = EU2(y) = y. The function φ (· )
takes the form of φ(EUτ ) = 1 − e−EUτ . The decision utility of choosing option x is then
V (x) = 0.5(1−e−1)+0.5×0 = 0.316, and the decision utility of choosing option y is V (y) =
1−e−y. It can be easily shown that when e1+e<y < 12 , the individual is better oﬀ by opting
for the lottery(λx; (1−λ)y) instead of choosing option x or option y. The decision utility of
such a lottery is: V (λx+(1−λ)y) = 0.5 [1− e−[λ×1+(1−λ)×y]]+0.5×[1− e−[λ×0+(1−λ)×y]].
Simple calculation shows that the optimal λ:
λ∗ =

0
−ln( y1−y )
1
y ≥ 12 ,
e
1+e<y <
1
2 ,
y ≤ e1+e .
Figure 2 provides the optimal λ for the value of y. As one can see, when Option y
becomes more attractive, the value of λ∗ decreases. Moreover, λ∗ approaches to 0.5 when
the two options become similar in terms of their decision utilities (V (y) = 0.314 versus
V (x) = 0.316).
Note that in the current setup, λ∗ is constructed as the ratio according to which the
individual is paid with Option x. As a ﬁrst interpretation of λ∗, note that the value of
λ∗ increases with the utility diﬀerence ∆τ of Option x over Option y. This feature of λ∗
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Figure 2: The optimal λ∗ depending on the value of y. Figure is produced by assuming
φ(EUτ ) = 1 − e−EUτ , Prob(u1) = 0.5, Prob(u2) = 0.5, EU1(x) = 1,EU2(x) = 0, and
EU1(y) = EU2(y) = y.
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is closely related to the error term in stochastic choice models, where the probability of
choosing the more attractive option is increasing with the utility diﬀerence of the more
attractive over the less attractive option (see, e.g., Loomes and Sugden, 1998). In this
sense, the value of λ∗ can be interpreted as the choice probability in stochastic choice
models. When preferences are incomplete, the choice probability is moderated by the
incompleteness in preferences. An increase in σ2x, i.e., when the individual's preference
over Option x versus Option y becomes less complete, decreases its probability of being
chosen. As a second interpretation, the mechanism through which λ∗ is obtained and the
interpretation of λ∗ have a striking similarity to an old idea in psychology: the matching
law in operant conditioning (Herrnstein, 1961; McDowell, 2005). This states that the
probability of an alternative being chosen is based on the relative attractiveness of options.
It is observed in both animals and human agents and is considered as a clear violation of
rational choices. However, Loewenstein et al. (2009) show that the matching law can be
made consistent with rational choices if we regard the choices of a single subject as being
made up of a sequence of multiple selves - one for each instant of time. Although their result
is obtained in an entirely diﬀerent context, the fundamental idea is surprisingly similar.
Last, due to the incompleteness in preferences, the individual orders Option x better than
Option y with some utility functions and shows the reverse preference ordering with others,
and she considers all utility functions relevant. By choosing a combination ratio λ rather
than either of the two options, she exhibits a preference for convexity. Cerreia-Vioglio
(2009) interprets the preference for convexity as a preference for hedging and links it to
uncertainty about future tastes.
Among others, Dwenger et al. (2014) and Agranov and Ortoleva (2015) experimentally
examine individuals' preferences for deliberate randomization. Compared to their methods,
our setting has three advantages. First, we need only one choice to reveal preferences for
deliberate randomization and the extent of randomization, whereas Agranov and Ortoleva
(2015) need a number of repeated choices to do so. Second, our randomization emerges
endogenously and the extent of randomization varies with choice pairs, whereas in Dwenger
et al. (2014) the randomization is exogenously ﬁxed by a random device. Third, our
measure is continuous.
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Figure 3: The experimental implementation of the elicitation method for the incomplete-
ness in preferences. Subjects move the slider to decide their optimal λ∗.
3.1 An experimental implementation of the measurement mechanism
To test our model and check the performance of our measure of the incompleteness in
preferences, we ran an experiment in which subjects faced a table consisting of ten choice
pairs: Option x versus Option y. Option x was a payment of 20 euro in one month's time,
while Option y consisted of an immediate payment ranging from 11 euro to 20 euro with
1 euro increments. Note that both Option x and Option y are sure payments. This allows
us to interpret the combination ratio λ as the probability according to which subjects are
paid with Option x. For example, subjects could choose to be paid accordingly to option
x with a probability of 0.75, while being paid according to option y with a probability
of 0.25. The increment of this payment probability was speciﬁed at 0.01. Figure 3.1
illustrates the elicitation method. There is no existing method for the measurement of the
incompleteness in preferences. There are related measures in a literature closely related to
incomplete preferences, the so-called imprecise preferences. In Butler and Loomes (2007),
for example, subjects were asked to make a straight choice and indicate how conﬁdent they
felt about their choice. They could state their conﬁdence in ﬁve steps: surely Option x,
probably Option x, unsure, probably Option y, and surely Option y. We use this measure
as a robustness check for our measure.
The experiment was conducted online with a random sample of students from Radboud
University between Oct. 21st to Oct. 30th, 2015. It was programmed with OTree (Chen
et al., 2015). The experiment contained several other tasks which will be reported in sep-
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Figure 4: A simulation of optimal λ given diﬀerent values of the sure payment in Option
y. The present value of Option x is assumed to be 18. The parametric form of the
probability weighting function is δp
γ
(δpγ+(1−p)γ)1/γ , and the value function is u(x) = x
α, with
δ = 0.76, γ = 0.69 and α = 0.88 . The values of δ, γ and α are chosen according to the
estimates in Tversky and Fox (1995).
arate papers. The whole experiment lasted on average 15 minutes. In total, 92 students
participated in the experiment. Each student received 2.5 euro participation fee. Addi-
tionally, 20% of students were chosen for real payment. The average payment was 22.50
euro among the chosen students.
Before presenting the experimental results, we oﬀer the predictions under the two most
popular theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty: the expected utility theory
(EUT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT).
Predictions under EUT: λ ∈ (0, 1) occurs only when subjects are indiﬀerent between
Option x and Option y. This results follows directly from the independence axiom. To
see this, suppose subjects prefer Option x over Option y, then by the independence axiom
λOption x+(1−λ)Option x is preferred to λOption x+(1−λ)Option y, and thus a mixing
of Option x with Option y is not optimal. The other case obtains similarly.
Predictions under CPT: λ ∈ (0, 1) is possible with some values of the sure payment of y,
but the relationship between the value of λ and the sure payment of y is not smooth; there
exhibits a jump: subjects start with choosing λ = 1 and then suddenly choose a λ close to
0. The above result is based on simulations. Intuitively, the violation of betweenness comes
from the overweighting of small probabilities. Thus, the optimal λ is chosen such that the
probability for the less attractive option is strongly overweighted. With most popular
probability weighting functions, this occurs when λ is around 0.1. Figure 3.1 depicts a
simulation. As it can be seen, the optimal λ starts with 1 when the sure payment of y is
low, jumps to 0.09 when the value of Option y is close to the value of Option x, and ends
up with 0 when the sure payment of y is suﬃciently attractive.
Predictions under Cerreia-Vioglio et al.'s (2015) model:
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Figure 5: A boxplot of the payment probabilities that subjects assign to Option x, as a
function of the value of Option y. The thick lines are median, the upper and lower bars
are 1st and 3rd quartiles, respectively.
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Experimental results are summarized in Figure 5. There are mainly two important features
of Figure 5. First, a majority of subjects assigned positive payment probabilities to Option
y when Option y was suﬃciently attractive. Only 16 out of 92 students could be identiﬁed
as having complete preferences: they ﬁrst assigned λ = 1, and then assigned λ = 0 when
Option y was suﬃciently attractive (for 14 out of 16 students this occurred when Option y
was 20 euro). Second, the λ assigned to Option x decreased with the value of the Option
y . The median payment λs assigned to Option x were, respectively, 1.00 when Option y
was 15 euro or lower, 0.955 when Option y was 16 euro, 0.87 when Option y was 17 euro,
0.65 when Option y was 18 euro, 0.45 when Option y was 19 euro, 0.00 when Option y was
20 euro. Therefore, subjects exhibited a clear preference for mixing Option x with Option
y. Such a preference for mixing is consistent with our model but stands in sharp contrast
with the expected utility theory. The relationship between λ and the value of Option y is
smooth, which cannot be captured by CPT.
The measures of conﬁdence statements in, e.g., Butler and Loomes (2007) provide valu-
able insights beyond dichotomous choices. One possible criticism regarding those measures
could be, however, that conﬁdence statements are self-reports and they could mean dif-
ferently for diﬀerent people. Below we link the conﬁdence statements to our quantitative
measure. We ﬁnd, ﬁrstly, that the same conﬁdence statement could indeed correspond
to diﬀerent λs. As one can observe from Figure 6, there is a signiﬁcant heterogeneity
of combination ratios in each conﬁdence statement, in particular Probably x, Unsure,
Probably y , and Surely y .
Secondly, we observe that choosing surely x approximately corresponds to assigning op-
tion x to a median payment probability of 1.00; choosing probably x approximately
corresponds to assigning option x to a median payment probability of 0.90; choosing un-
sure roughly corresponds to assigning option x to a median payment probability of 0.70;
choosing probably y approximately corresponds to assigning option x to a median pay-
ment probability of 0.56; choosing surely y corresponds to assigning option x to a median
payment probability of 0.35. The above result reveals a clear asymmetry: given the same
qualitative statements, i.e., surely or probably, subjects used a much higher combina-
tion ratio of Option x than Option y. A possible interpretation of the above asymmetry
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Figure 6: A boxplot of the combination ratio of Option x, given each conﬁdence statements.
The thick line is median, the upper and lower bars are 2nd and 3rd quartiles, respectively.
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is that subjects made qualitative statements such as surely or probably based on the
Eτ [∆τ ], the expected utility diﬀerence between Option x and Option y, while the optimal
combination ratio λ depended additionally on the imprecision over Option y , as revealed
by Equation 4.
4 Discussion
Our model is related to the literature of probabilistic choices. Models of probabilistic
choices (see, e.g., Harless and Camerer, 1994b; Hey and Orme, 1994) assume that a true
preference exists and is deterministic. This serves as the core of individuals' preferences.
However, individuals' choices are probabilistic due to errors such as mistakes, carelessness,
slips, inattentiveness, etc. Our model is fundamentally diﬀerent from these models. It
assumes no error term, and the choices are deterministic. Most importantly, individuals
do not have a unique preference; instead, they have a set of utility functions. In models
of random utility (McFadden, 1973; McFadden and Train, 2000), an individual's utility
function is subject to random shocks. Ex ante, the individual can thus be seen as facing
a set of utility functions. A similar model is the so-called random preferences model
by Loomes and Sugden (1995). This model assumes that an individual's preferences are
imprecise and may vary from one moment to the next, and/or she may not know them
with absolute precision. This idea is developed further by Karni and Safra (2014). In their
model, individuals have a set of utility functions  states of mind in their paper  and
their actual choice is determined by the state of mind that obtains. The paper shares some
features with models on choice over menus (e.g., Ahn and Sarver, 2013; Karni and Safra,
2014). Ahn and Sarver (2013) assume that individuals are uncertain about their future
preferences. The uncertainty in preferences leads to (1) a preference for menus with more
options, i.e., a preference for ﬂexibility; and (2) probabilistic choices from a given menu.
The uncertainty in preferences is captured by individuals having a set of potential future
preferences. Our model shares this notion in that it assumes an individual has multiple
utility functions. There is one crucial diﬀerence, though. In models of random utility, an
individual makes a decision based on a single utility function at any particular moment,
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although her preferences may vary over time or are not known with certainty. The utility
function she uses might change over time, leading to preference reversals. In our model,
the individual has a set of preference relationships at any particular moment, and she
uses all of them when making a decision. Furthermore, when aggregating across preference
relationships, the individual is averse to incomplete preferences. In the random preferences
model, the aversion to incomplete preferences plays no role.
Our model is closely connected to an idea called imprecise preferences, in which it is
suggested that individuals might have diﬃculty to pin down a precise value of an alter-
native (Cubitt et al., 2015). The measurement of the imprecision in preferences has been
tricky. Dubourg et al. (1994) and Dubourg et al. (1997), in addition to standard choices,
use un-incentivised responses to capture imprecise preferences. Subjects are considered to
have imprecise preferences when they report that they are uncertain about their choices.
Similarly, Butler and Loomes (2007) use two levels of responses to capture imprecise pref-
erences: deﬁnitely preferred and probably preferred. Butler et al. (2014) introduce a
continuous measurement of imprecise preferences, which they call the strength of prefer-
ences. Cubitt et al. (2015) allow subjects comparing a risky lottery and a sure payment
to report that they are not sure about their preferences. The above measures of imprecise
preferences provide valuable additional information on individuals' decision making, which
cannot be captured by choices. However, the above elicitation mechanisms are based more
on intuition than on concrete theories, and the interpretation of these measures is not
entirely clear. For example, the measure of strength of preference is meant to capture
the perceived relative degree of preference diﬀerence between the two options. But, as
acknowledged by Butler et al. (2014), some participants might have instead reported their
conﬁdence on their decision. Our measurement mechanism is developed from a rigorous
model and is incentive compatible. Of course, our model has a diﬀerent focus from that
of the imprecise preferences; it aims to capture the process of completing an incomplete
preference relation. But we believe the measurement mechanism can be used as a supple-
mentary tool for the measurement of the imprecision in preferences. As we demonstrated
in Section 3.1, the value of λ can be intuitively linked to the conﬁdence of choices.
Finally, the idea of individuals having a set of utility functions is related to the concept
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of multiple selves. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) propose an intertemporal dual-self model
where individuals possess two selves at the same time: a long-term and a short-term self,
and the two selves might conﬂict with each other. Kalai et al. (2002) argue that one might
use more than one rationale - with one rationale corresponding to one self - in making
choices. In a similar spirit, Kalai et al. (2002), Manzini and Mariotti (2007) propose
a decision procedure in which the decision maker sequentially uses two selves to make
choices. The above models assume that the active preference relationship, i.e., the speciﬁc
self that is activated, depends on the set of alternatives. However, given a particular set of
alternatives, an individual activates only one self, and the active self has a clear preference
over the alternatives. In the current model, incomplete preferences arise when an individual
is uncertain about her relevant utility function over a given set of alternatives. Diﬀerent
utility functions oﬀer a diﬀerent ordering of the same set of alternatives.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a model of completing incomplete preferences with an axiomatic foun-
dation. Incomplete preferences are captured by individuals having not a single but a set
of utility functions. Individuals perform standard expected utility calculations, given any
speciﬁc utility function, and have an subjective expectation of the transformed standard
expected utilities with respect to a set of utility functions. We show that two empirical
puzzles - the WTP-WTA gap and the present bias - are natural consequences of incomplete
preferences.
Based on this model, we propose an incentive-compatible mechanism to measure the degree
of incomplete preferences. In the mechanism, individuals face two alternatives. Instead
of choosing one alternative, as in typical pairwise choice tasks, individuals are allowed to
allocate the probabilities according to which they are paid with the alternative or the sure
payment. When individuals' preferences are incomplete and their behavior is in line with
our model, we show that the value assigned to the alternative provides a proxy for the
degree of the incompleteness in preferences over the alternative. The obtained measure
can be interpreted as the choice probability in stochastic choice models and has a striking
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similarity to the matching law in operant conditioning. An experimental implementation
of the measure provides results consistent with our model but challenges standard utility
theory.
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Appendix 1: The proof of Theorem
By assumption 3, l1  l2 ⇐⇒ f1 f f2. By assumption 2, f1 f f2 ⇐⇒
´
Γ v[f1(τ)]dpi ≥´
Γ v[f2(τ)]dpi. Deﬁnition 2 states that f(τ) = ceτ (l) for all τ∈Γ . Thus, we have f1 f
f2 ⇐⇒
´
Γ v[ceτ (l1)]dpi ≥
´
Γ v[ceτ (l2)]dpi. Together it gives:
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
ˆ
Γ
v[ceτ (l1)]dpi ≥
ˆ
Γ
v[ceτ (l2)]dpi.
Since v and uτ are strictly increasing, v[ceτ (l1)] = φ {uτ [ceτ (l1)]} for some strictly increas-
ing φ(·). Substituting v[ceτ (l1)] with φ {uτ [ceτ (l1)]}, we have
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
ˆ
Γ
φ {u[ceτ (l1)]} dpi ≥
ˆ
Γ
φ {uτ [ceτ (l2)]} dpi.
By Assumption 1, uτ [ceτ (l)] = EUτ (l), and ﬁnally we have
l1  l2 ⇐⇒
ˆ
Γ
φ [EUτ (l1)] dpi ≥
ˆ
Γ
φ [EUτ (l2)] dpi. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: The proof of Proposition
Proof: Without loss of generality assume φ(0) = 0. Since φ(·) is strictly concave, we have
0 =
ˆ
Γ
φ[EUτ (x)− uτ (WTP )]dpi < φ
{ˆ
Γ
[EUτ (x)− uτ (WTP )]dpi
}
,
and
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0 =
ˆ
Γ
φ[uτ (WTA)− EUτ (x)]dpi < φ
{ˆ
Γ
[uτ (WTA)− EUτ (x)]dpi
}
.
Together we have
0 <
ˆ
Γ
EUτ (x)dpi −
ˆ
Γ
uτ (WTP )]dpi,
and
0 <
ˆ
Γ
uτ (WTA)dpi −
ˆ
Γ
EUτ (x)]dpi.
Thus,
ˆ
Γ
uτ (WTP )]dpi <
ˆ
Γ
EUτ (x)dpi <
ˆ
Γ
[uτ (WTA)dpi.
Finally, note that
´
Γ uτ (x)]dpi is monotonically increasing in x, one obtainsWTP < WTA.
Q.E.D.
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